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The contemporary view of the relationship between conscious and unconscious 
intentionality consists in two claims: (i) unconscious propositional attitudes represent the 
world the same way conscious ones do, and (ii) both sets of attitudes represent by having 
determinate propositional content. Crane (2017) has challenged both claims, proposing 
instead that unconscious propositional attitudes differ from conscious ones in being less 
determinate in nature. This paper aims to evaluate Crane’s proposal. In particular, I make 
explicit and critique certain assumptions Crane makes in support of his asymmetry, and 
argue for a conditional claim: if Crane is right that unconscious intentional states are 
(relatively) indeterminate, this suggests that conscious intentional states are indeterminate in 
a similar fashion as well. 
1. Introduction 
What is the relationship between conscious and unconscious intentionality? According to 
the  contemporary view, (i) unconscious propositional attitudes represent the world the 
same way conscious ones do, and (ii) both sets of attitudes represent by having 
determinate propositional content. Crane (2017) has recently challenged both claims, 
proposing instead that unconscious propositional attitudes differ from conscious ones in 
being less determinate in nature.
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With regards to this comparison, Crane’s primary focus is the structure of 
unconscious psychological reality. Analytic philosophers on the whole don’t tend to ask 
questions about the unconscious, let alone inquire into its intentional aspects. On the rare 
occasion when they have done so, they have tended to deny the existence of unconscious 
intentional states (e.g. Searle, 1992). The rest of us seem to assume that what goes for 
conscious intentionality also goes for that of the unconscious. Crane, drawing inspiration 
from Freud, prefers a different view: the unconscious comes with its own rules and 
principles.  More specifically, and I now speak for Crane not Freud, the unconscious is 1
holistic in nature, and its contents are far less determinate than those present in 
consciousness.
It is instructive to put this in Crane’s own terminology. According to Crane, beliefs 
are always unconscious, and are to be contrasted with thoughts, which are always 
conscious.  Moreover, Crane introduces the notion of a 'worldview', which consists of a 2
subject’s entire system of belief, i.e. their entire unconscious representation of the world. 
The crux of Crane’s position is that a worldview 'can be less specific, coherent and 
determinate than ordinary psychological ascriptions often suggest' (2017, p. 2).
We do not find an argument for this view in Crane’s paper. What we find, rather, is 
an explanation for why we have been misled into thinking that unconscious propositional 
attitudes represent the world in the same way conscious ones do. In summary:
 This reading of Freud is due to Wollheim (1971). See also Freud (1953–1964).1
 Nothing hangs on this in the present context. If you disagree with Crane, you can simply 2
substitute his claims about ‘belief’ for those about 'unconscious belief’, and claims about ’thought’ 
for those concerning ‘conscious thought’.
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My hypothesis is that cognitive science, commonsense psychology and 
psychoanalysis all operate with a conception of the unconscious as something that 
has a causal structure which is modelled by the attributions of propositional content 
by the theorist or the therapist. In order for these attributions to provide a 
successful interpretation of the unconscious mind, there is no requirement that they 
correspond in any straightforward sense to individual inner states with determinate 
propositional contents. The same is true of the subject’s own first-person reflections 
on their worldview, and on their unconscious motivations. (Crane 2017, pp. 18–19)
,
Investigations into the nature of intentionality tend to start with the assumption that at 
least some propositional attitude ascriptions are true. For example, consider the ascription, 
‘Zita believes that Freud lived in North London’. What would it take for this ascription to 
be true? Typically, we think propositional attitude ascriptions are made true by individual 
inner states with determinate contents. The ascription concerning Zita, then, is true just in 
case she actually has an inner state with the content <Freud lived in North London>. 
Crane’s insight is that such ascriptions, when concerning unconscious intentionality, can be 
true even if there are no individual mental states with determinate contents. That is, they 
can be true even if the structure of unconscious intentionality is far less determinate than 
these practices suggest.
This is no doubt a controversial position, but one to which I am, nevertheless, 
sympathetic. My contention is with the caveat. Why think the grounds for believing that 
unconscious intentional states are indeterminate stop at the level just below 
consciousness? Put another way, if unconscious intentional states are (relatively) 
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indeterminate, why aren’t conscious intentional states likewise indeterminate? This paper 
aims to address this question. 
In what follows, I tease out certain key assumptions Crane makes in support of his 
proposal. First, I argue that Crane’s claim that unconscious intentional states are 
(relatively) indeterminate rests on adopting a version of interpretationism, which holds 
that the nature of unconscious belief can be understood in terms of interpretation. Here I 
also make the point that since Crane doesn’t adopt interpretationism wholesale, this 
allows him room to consider conscious  intentional states, e.g. thoughts, as still being 
determinate (§2). I then turn to why Crane thinks thoughts are, as a matter of fact, 
determinate. I argue that implicit in Crane’s reasoning must be a controversial form of 
sententialism, which holds that we (mostly) think by tokening sentences in a natural 
language (§3). Finally, I go on to raise some doubts about this form of sententialism by 
way of challenging Crane’s proposed asymmetry (§4). I conclude that if Crane is right that 
unconscious intentional states are (relatively) indeterminate, this suggests that conscious 
intentional states are indeterminate in a similar fashion as well. 
2. Interpretationism about belief
Precisely in what sense are (unconscious) beliefs supposed to be indeterminate? According 
to Crane, 'A lot of what we believe is incomplete, partial, confused, and even 
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contradictory' (2017, p. 11). Crane takes this as a datum; one that needs explaining.  But 3
before we get to an explanation, I think it also calls for clarification. 
Some insight into what Crane means by unconscious states being ‘indeterminate’ 
can be found by considering discussions of indeterminacy in the context of interpretation. 
(This isn’t a stretch because interpretation, as we shall see shortly, is central to Crane’s 
proposal). To begin, following Child (1994), we can make a distinction between two kinds 
of indeterminacy. Both problematise the standard assumption that propositional attitudes 
have determinate contents. But they do so in different ways. The first better speaks to the 
notion of incomplete or partially formed beliefs. Here the problem is with ascribing 'full-
blown' propositional attitudes to subjects owing to the context-dependent nature of mental 
descriptions, which result in vague or borderline cases. This is best seen by example:
Consider, for instance, a child who is learning to use the word ‘sister’, and who has 
reached a stage where she knows that ‘sister’ applies to her own sisters, but does 
not realise that someone can be a sister without being a sister of hers. (Child, 1994, 
p. 69)
Such cases, according to Child, are borderlines cases where it is indeterminate whether 
subjects have the relevant beliefs, e.g. that the child believes that Katy is her sister. 
Crucially, such indeterminacy arises not because there is no fact of the matter about which 
competing ascriptions best describe the subject’s propositional attitudes, but because 'the 
 Crane argues that this datum is best explained by the view that treats propositional attitude 3
ascriptions as (mere) models, as opposed to the standard picture which takes such ascriptions to 
coincide with individual belief states with determinate content.
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facts of the matter are not reportable by simple ascriptions of the form ’S believes that 
p’' (p. 70).
The second type of indeterminacy, by contrast, arises precisely because there is no 
fact of the matter about which competing ascriptions best describe a subject’s 
propositional attitudes. This is the indeterminacy of interpretation, owing to Davidson (1974) 
and developed further by Dennett (1991).  As Child reads Davidson, this kind of 4
indeterminacy, ultimately, is a product of different methods of interpretation being 
empirically equivalent. In brief, given that an agent’s choice is determined jointly by their 
beliefs and desires, there will be numerous distinct ascriptions of beliefs and desires which 
will equally explain their choice. Some of these ascriptions can be eliminated when we 
require ascriptions to count for not just a single choice but a whole host of data. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that not all such ascriptions can be thus eliminated, in which 
case there will be competing propositional attitude ascriptions that prove empirically 
equivalent.5
What we have yet to explain is why an empirical equivalence results in there being 
no fact of the matter of which ascriptions are correct. One could insist, for instance, that 
there is an individual belief state, with determinate propositional content, which actually 
explains the subject’s choice — regardless of whether their dispositional profile 
underdetermines which belief we should ascribe to them from a set of competing beliefs. 
 Note: this is not to be confused with Quine’s (1960) indeterminacy of translation.4
 For Crane, the holism of the intentional 'guarantees' that we can’t have one-to-one mappings 5
between individual beliefs and their dispositional profiles (p. 13).
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The key assumption for both Davidson and Dennett is interpretationism. According to 
such an interpretationism:
all there is to being a true believer is being a system whose behaviour is reliably 
predictable via the intentional strategy, and hence all there is to really and truly 
believing that p (for any proposition p) is being an intentional system for which p 
occurs as a belief in the best (most predictive) interpretation. (Dennett, 1987, p. 29)
The strategy in question is the intentional stance, where we treat a subject as a rational 
agent who has beliefs and desires, and whose actions can be explained on the basis of their 
having these mental states. Interpretationism tells us that our being able to adopt this 
strategy to successfully predict the behaviour of a subject is constitutive of this subject 
having the relevant beliefs and desires. 
The commitments of interpretationism concerning belief, thus understood, do not 
entail the indeterminacy of interpretation. However, they do so when coupled with the 
aforementioned claim about empirical equivalence. If all there is for a belief ascription to 
be true is for that ascription to be the most predictive ascription that could be assigned by 
an interpreter, and if there are distinct belief ascriptions which are empirically equivalent, 
and ergo equally predictive, there will be no fact of the matter about which belief, amongst 
a set of competing beliefs, is actually had by the agent. The difference between Davidson 
and Dennett is that Dennett thinks this framework allows for an even more radical form of 
indeterminacy, where distinct empirically equivalent methods of interpretation may 
sometimes ascribe beliefs with conflicting propositional contents.
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Crane’s datum, i.e. that unconscious beliefs can be 'incomplete, partial, confused, 
and even contradictory', allows for both forms of indeterminacy specified by Child. His 
main focus, and the kind of indeterminacy peculiar to the unconscious, however, is the 
second. That is to say the indeterminacy of our worldview, which Crane takes as a datum, 
primarily has to do with an absence of any facts that determine which competing, even 
conflicting, ascriptions best describe a subject’s worldview. In this way, we see that 
interpretationism is crucial to understanding Crane’s proposed worldview. 
But that is not all. Interpretationism also helps explain why conscious intentionality 
mightn’t suffer from the same kind of indeterminacy. In brief, interpretationism for Crane 
doesn’t hold true for all forms of intentionality.His example is the intentional activity of 
interpretation itself: 'For one thing, interpretation itself is a mental activity, so we cannot 
expect all intentionality to be explained in terms of interpretation … Conscious acts of 
interpretation do not require interpretation to give them their content' (2007, pp. 14–15). If 
that’s right, i.e. if conscious intentional states gain their contents not by interpretation but 
through some other means, this tells us that it might be possible for them to have 
determinate contents — even if the competing ascriptions that best describe them prove to 
be empirically equivalent. So the fact that interpretation doesn’t apply to conscious 
intentional states explains why it might be possible for such states to be determinate. Let 
us now look at why they must be determinate on Crane’s picture. 
3. Sententialism about thought
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According to Crane, conscious thoughts are determinate in a way (unconscious) beliefs are 
not. This is supposed to hold true for thoughts we have about our beliefs as well. The idea, 
roughly, is as follows.
According to the contemporary view, when we introspect what we believe, we 
bring to conscious awareness the determinate contents of these beliefs, whereas when we 
make up our minds, we impose a certain determinate structure on the contents of our 
indeterminate mental states and thereby make them determinate. Crane seeks to collapse 
this distinction. As we saw, the contents of unconscious beliefs are not determinate 
propositional contents waiting to be discovered. Rather, unconscious intentionality tends 
to be indeterminate, and what we do when we introspect is make a conscious judgement 
as to the contents of our beliefs, which in turn imposes on them a certain determinate 
structure. Introspecting our beliefs, then, is akin to making up our minds. 
One way to unpack this idea is to suppose that the act of judgement involves 
picking out a single belief-content from the set of competing contents we may ascribe to a 
subject’s belief — even when the subject is oneself. For example, it may be indeterminate 
whether I truly believe that the Prime Minster is clumsy. However, introspection involves 
considering an array of belief contents I may ascribe to myself (e.g. <he is>, <he isn’t>), 
which is typically followed by a conscious judgement as to which belief content I should 
ascribe to myself. In this way, though the contents of beliefs themselves may be 
indeterminate, our conscious awareness of the content of any given belief involves 
determinate content. Another way of making this point is to say that when we introspect 
our beliefs, we in effect interpret them using certain determinate propositional contents. As 
Crane puts it, the 'central phenomenon here is interpretation. To model an aspect of a 
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worldview with a proposition is to interpret it' (2017, p. 14). For Crane, this holds true 
whether we are interpreting our own worldview or the worldview of others.
But why does making a conscious judgement assign a fixed determinate content to 
a belief? For instance, why can’t judgements themselves have indeterminate content? 
According to Crane, an answer lies in the way conscious judgements involve language:
The clearest way in which the content of a worldview can become the content of a 
conscious judgement is when one says something, either aloud or to oneself … 
When we use words to express our beliefs, often by uttering a sentence, we impose 
an order on what we think which can then make our subsequent dispositions more 
determinate. (Crane, 2017, p. 14)
The process of discovering what you believe, like that of making up your mind, involves 
articulating the contents of your beliefs in language, which inevitably ascribes determinate 
contents to these beliefs. As Dennett puts it, 'our linguistic environment is forever forcing 
us to give — or concede — precise verbal expression to convictions that lack the hard 
edges verbalization endows them with' (1987, p. 21).
So far we have been considering thoughts we have about what we believe. But the 
same is supposed to hold true for thoughts which don’t bear on any of our beliefs. In most 
cases, to entertain a thought in consciousness, according to Crane, is to entertain a mental 
representation via the use of language, which inevitably results in our thoughts having 
determinate content. At this point it is worth being clear on the scope of Crane’s proposal. 
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He doesn’t just assume that some of our thoughts are more determinate than our beliefs, 
but that thoughts, in general, are more determinate than our beliefs.  6
This is also precisely the point at which the proposal becomes questionable. Crane's 
proposed asymmetry between conscious and unconscious intentionality seems to be 
grounded in the not entirely uncontroversial premise that all, if not most, conscious 
thought is linguistic. Crane considers this explicitly in earlier work: 'Maybe the ‘vehicle’ of 
the content of a conscious thought is words running through your mind' (Crane, 2013a, p. 
171).  But this is something that needs to be more than mere speculation for the present 7
purpose. A full-blown critique of the contemporary conception of the relationship between 
conscious and unconscious intentionality, as it turns out, rests on this very premise.  8
To clarify, I don’t think there is enough textual evidence to establish that Crane 
actually assumes that all, if not most, thoughts are linguistic. My claim, rather, is that 
Crane must assume that most thoughts are linguistic because otherwise he doesn’t have 
support for his proposed asymmetry. Put another way, it remains unclear whether Crane 
 Crane's actual conclusion is even bolder, i.e. that there is a significant difference between the 6
structures of unconscious and conscious intentionality. To establish this conclusion, Crane must 
hold that linguistic representation is not just a feature of our thoughts, but of all, if not most of, our 
conscious intentional states — be they thoughts, judgements, hopes, desires, imaginings, and so 
on.  For the sake of simplicity, in this paper I will restrict my discussion to thoughts.
 Likewise, elsewhere Crane notes that 'often we think in words' (2016, p. 15), which shows a 7
sympathy towards, though not a full-blown commitment to, the view that  thinking is typically 
linguistic in nature
 The are other ways to maintain the asymmetry which Crane does not consider. E.g. you could 8
suppose, à la Pitt (2004), that phenomenal character alone suffices to confer conscious thoughts 
their determinate character. See Kriegel (2014) for a survey, and Vicente and Jorba (2019) for a 
response. It is worth noting that Vicente and Jorba’s response is motivated by a view concerning 
linguistic thinking similar to Crane’s.
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actually makes this assumption. But I think it is reasonable to suggest that he must assume 
it given that all he says by way of supporting the view that conscious states are more 
determinate than unconscious ones consists of the aforementioned passages; ones where 
the determine nature of conscious states is attributed to our use of words.  9
It is also important to clarify here the distinction between mental representation 
which is linguistic in form and that which is propositional. At minimum, for a 
representation to have propositional content is for it to have the kind of content which can 
be true or false. The contents of sentences are often propositional in nature.  But not all 10
propositional content is, arguably, sentential or linguistic in form. The content of a map 
can, arguably, be propositional in nature. For instance, the Sydney map represents Bondi 
Beach as being to the southeast of the Harbour Bridge. On this basis, it can be said to have 
the propositional content <Bondi Beach is to the southeast of the Harbour Bridge>.  The 11
point of contention is not whether thoughts are propositional, but whether they are 
linguistic. In particular, whether they involve sentences, composed of words. 
The view that thoughts are sentences (or sentence-like) is a version of sententialism: 
roughly, the view that mental representation is linguistic in nature.  Sententialists divide 12
 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this concern.  9
 Not all sentences are propositional, e.g. sentences which express imperatives aren’t propositional 10
because they are neither true nor false.
 Whether the same could be said for the content of pictures is a point of contention. Crane (2009) 11
denies that pictures have propositional content on grounds that propositions, unlike the contents 
of pictures, can be asserted or denied, and can stand in logical relations. See Grzankowski (2015) 
and Camp (2018) for a reply.
 Advocates of this view include Sellars (1956), Harman (1973), Fodor (1975), Gauker (1994), 12
Carruthers (1996), and Devitt and Sterelny (1999).
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into two. Those who accept the language of thought hypothesis, as championed by 
Harman (1973) and Fodor (1975), claim that our thoughts are sentences in aa non-natural 
language or mentalese. The rest assume that our thoughts aren sentences in a natural 
language. The point for us is that 'the hard edge of determinacy' conferred to our thoughts 
for both Dennett and Crane is an inevitable consequence of the use of natural language; it 
is the use of words that 'impose an order on what we think' (Crane, 2017, p. 14). 
Consequently, the topic under investigation is the view according to which when you 
token a thought that p, you token a sentence in some natural language that means p. As an 
English speaker, when I think of my friend that he likes anything sweet, I token the 
English sentence 'he likes anything sweet'. If I spoke Polish, I might token the Polish 
sentence, 'On lubi wszystko, co jest słodkie', and so on.13
Both forms of sententialism are controversial, but both forms of it are also very 
much live options. Since it is the natural language version of sententialism which is 
integral to Crane’s proposal, we can put the plausibility of the language of thought 
hypothesis aside. The obvious question is, How plausible is the natural language version 
of sententialism? This is an important question, one which is directly relevant for our 
purposes. However, we should be careful to make a distinction between the natural 
language version of sententialism, as commonly understood, and the more literal reading 
 It is not obvious why Crane focusses on the natural language version of the language of thought, 13
as a mental language, à la Fodor, would seem to possess the sorts of discrete symbols that could 
also render thoughts determinate. I would like to leave this as an open possibility alongside other 
ways thoughts could be determinate, e.g. via their phenomenal profiles. I suspect Crane himself 
doesn’t entertain this possibility because he is sceptical that this version of the language of thought 
hypothesis is true on grounds that, for an empirically testable hypothesis, we still lack any 
empirical basis to accept it.
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of it, which Crane needs to support his asymmetry. In this way, we see that there is another 
question even more relevant for our purposes, one concerning the plausibility of this 
literal version.
4. Thinking in words 
To recap, sententialism comes in many forms, but the asymmetry between (unconscious) 
belief and (conscious) thought rests on a very particular kind of sententialism, one that 
presupposes that thoughts are (predominantly) sentences in a natural language. More 
specifically, since it is the use of words which gives thoughts their determinate contents, 
the kind of sententialism in question must presuppose that words literally figure in 
thought. The problem with this view, I argue, is that it is insufficiently motivated. 
There are really two aspects to this problem. First, advocates of the natural 
language version of sententialism don’t tend to accept that we literally think in words. 
Second, even if they did, there is insufficient evidence for this claim. Consider the first 
issue. In practice, sententialists find it useful to model thought via language. Kukla and 
Lance, for instance, observe that while it is common to refer to thought as inner speech, 
'Most philosophers readily admit that thought is not literally inner speech, but find it 
unproblematic to extend the linguistic toolbox inwards, as it were' (2016, p. 81).  14
Moreover, to the extent that this modelling presupposes a literal isormophism between 
language and thought, this tends to be assumed at the level of structure. Some have gone 
so far as to suggest that this is all we can assume:
 Their original target is Sellars’s (1956) project of modelling communicative thought on the basis 14
of  inner speech.
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What precisely would be required for a mentalese sentence to be a sentence of, say, 
English? Clearly it must consist of English words in an English structure. We think 
sense can be made of it having an English structure. But what sense can be made of 
it consisting of English words? What would make a mental word English? We 
doubt that there is a theoretically interesting answer.' (Devitt and Sterelny, 1999, p. 
145)
Sententialists, then, don’t tend to assume that we literally think in words. But perhaps they 
could. What’s so bad about assuming that we literally think in words anyway?
One answer, as suggested by Devitt and Sterelny, is that it is nonsensical. I find this 
way of raising scepticism about the literal reading too quick. This reading may seem far 
fetched, even empirically intractable, but this isn’t the same thing as saying that it is 
nonsensical. Unfortunately Devitt and Sterelny don’t elaborate on the matter. As far as I 
can tell, the nonsensicality charge is originally due to Ryle (1958). To my mind, Ryle 
doesn’t do a very thorough job of justifying this charge either, but it is instructive to look at 
Ryle for it helps us see more clearly what’s really wrong with this idea.
An initial reading of Ryle proves puzzling. On the one hand, Ryle is sceptical of the 
idea that we think in words: 'I want to deny that it even makes sense to ask, in the general 
case, what special sort or sorts of things we think in' (p. 13). However, on the other hand, 
Ryle also grants that thinking on occasion 'requires the inward or outward production of 
words or phrases (p. 10).  For instance, he believes this to be the case when we think about 
what to say in a poem or a post-dinner speech. But if thinking can involve the inward 
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production of words, why is it unintelligible to suppose that we normally think in words? 
Isn’t this, in effect, the same thing?
A way to reconcile this tension is to make a distinction between thinking in words 
and thinking which involves words. It may turn out that there are forms of thinking which 
plausibly do involve words, e.g. when we try to articulate to ourselves what to say in a 
speech, but this shouldn’t be taken to entail that we normally think in words — where 
words are the concrete vehicles  of thought, i.e. roughly, the ‘way’ those contents are 
represented; the way they are stored.  Ryle, I take it, accepts that thoughts can involve 15
words. His scepticism, then, is really about whether it makes sense to talk of the vehicles 
of thought.
I say Ryle’s scepticism is poorly defended because like Devitt and Sterelny, Ryle 
doesn’t really provide us with any reasons as to why it is nonsensical to suppose that we 
think in words.  But the aforementioned distinction helps us see what’s really wrong with 16
this idea. Most people I suspect are sympathetic to this notion because it introspectively 
seems to us as if we think in words. In other words, the main motivation for the literal 
version of sententialism is introspective evidence. The trouble is, our distinction shows 
this evidence to also be deceptively weak. In brief, introspection suggests that thought 
(somehow) involves words or sentences in a natural language. This much we can take for 
 E.g. consider a typical non-smoking sign, i.e. a drawing of a cigarette with a line across it, and a 15
translation of it in English. Both have the same content, <Do not smoke>, but the vehicles of 
representation are distinct: one is pictorial, the other is linguistic. See Crane (2013b).
 When Ryle does comment on the matter, he only goes so far as to argue that our typical 16
examples of thinking using words, e.g. say in English vs. French, don’t really suffice to explain the 
sense in which we 'think in' words. In short, he thinks there are better explanations of such 
examples on offer than the one suggested by sententialism. Also see Harman (1973, §8).
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granted. But does it suggest that we think in words? Or does it merely suggest that 
thinking involves words? Introspective evidence itself doesn’t seem to settle the issue. 
A similar point has also been made by Machery (2005) in his critique of the 
introspective argument for sententialism.  Machery begins by observing the distinction 17
between the content and the vehicle of thought. The content is what the thought is about, 
whereas the vehicle is the way the content of that thought is represented, i.e. whether it is 
linguistic, imagistic etc. Machery argues that once we make this distinction, it is hard to 
see how we can have introspective grounds to accept sententialism because introspection 
only reveals the contents of thought, not its vehicles. For instance, I can introspectively 
know what I am thinking, but I don’t seem to introspectively be able to also know the 
vehicles by which I can think these thoughts. Of course, the fact that it (sometimes) 
introspectively seems to us that we think in words needs to be accounted for, and Machery 
does so by suggesting that such seemings are really due to the fact that introspection also 
reveals the contents of auditory and articulatory images. We need not consider the matter 
settled. It suffices to note that the main source of evidence for the literal reading of 
sententialism, i.e. introspective evidence, is at best highly contestable.
In summary, the literal reading of sententalism is insufficiently motivated. It doesn’t 
seem to be a view actually defended by sententialists. What’s more, it doesn’t seem to be a 
view that could be adequately defended either; at least not on introspective grounds. The 
problem for Crane is that he must rely on the literal reading, viz. that we actually think in 
words, to maintain the asymmetry between conscious and unconscious intentionality. 
 Machery’s target is the version of sententialism defended by Carruthers (1996). For our 17
purposes, we need not take a stand on whether this critique bears fruit. The crucial point is that it 
is an especially apt critique of the literal version of sententialism under consideration here. 
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Here we find such a sententialism to be problematic, and ergo with it the alleged 
asymmetry. 
Here it would be remiss not to stress, once again, that Crane doesn’t actually 
commit to sententialism wholesale. Rather, the connection we find to the view in his work 
is (i) an assertion that we often think in words, (ii) speculation that the vehicles of 
conscious thought-contents are words running through our minds, and (iii) the idea that 
the clearest way thoughts get to be determinate is through their articulation in words. It is, 
therefore, entirely consistent with someone of Crane’s persuasion to insist that some 
thinking could outstrip thinking in words. Some of it could, say, be imagistic or even 
numeric. What should we make of this possibility?18
I think this is a genuine possibility on Crane’s view, but I don’t think it helps defend 
the asymmetry. In fact, if anything, it is a hindrance. The issue of whether it is a hindrance 
hangs on whether we read Crane as proposing an asymmetry which is categorical. If there 
is supposed to be a sharp, definitive divide between conscious and unconscious 
intentionality vis-a-vis their determinacy, and conscious thoughts being articulated in 
words is what justifies this asymmetry, then the existence of non-linguistic forms of 
thinking would put pressure on the idea that all conscious intentional states are 
determinate. So counterexamples to sententialism, rather than being helpful, would 
actually pose a challenge to Crane.
However, I don’t think this is Crane’s position. A better reading has it that the 
difference between conscious and unconscious intentionality is really a matter of degree. 
In particular, unconscious intentional states, i.e the states which make up a subject’s 
 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this journal for raising this concern. 18
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'worldview' are said to be 'less specific, coherent and determinate' than we typically 
assume (2017, p. 3). If that’s right, the existence of non-linguistic forms of thinking 
wouldn’t really pose a problem for Crane. That is, he could still hold that most thoughts 
are linguistic in order to justify his asymmetry.
But note that this more nuanced reading does nothing to address my worry; that 
when thinking is said to be linguistic on Crane’s picture, he must assume the implausible 
and unmotivated literal reading. To elaborate, the problem with Crane’s proposal isn’t that 
he assumes a full-blown version of sententialism, one that takes all thinking to be 
linguistic. The problem, rather, is that to the extent to which he assumes that thinking is 
linguistic, he must assume that we literally think words — a view I have argued is 
insufficiently motivated.  To my mind, a better response to this worry would be to offer an 
altogether different, and less contentious, account of what makes conscious thoughts 
determinate.
This is not the place to explore all the other ways thoughts could turn out 
determinate. However, to end, let us consider one idea that doesn’t take us too far from the 
one we have considered thus far. That is, conscious intentional states are determinate 
because words form the contents, as opposed to the vehicles, of conscious thought. This 
would still capture one of Crane’s key ideas, namely (iii), even though it won’t capture (i) 
and (ii). Moreover, I also think there is a case to be made that a lot of thoughts involve 
words in this sense. For example, when I judge that the painting before me reminds me of 
a painting by the artist Lucian Freud, I seem to think this to myself in words. It strikes me 
that this is why our thoughts seem determinate; when we try to introspect our thoughts, it 
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often seems as if we catch ourselves thinking in words. But the question is, can this be true 
of our thoughts in general? 
This is a thorny issue to which I won’t pretend to give a decisive answer here. It 
partly depends on whether we adopt an inclusive or restrictive notion of thought. Kukla 
and Lance, for instance, operate on an inclusive notion when they ask to consider 'the 
regular flow of thought—day dreams, minor arithmetic calculations, the fleeting worry 
that a cockroach will come closer...' (p. 93). These sorts of conscious intentional states 
needn’t take shape in the form of auditory or articulatory imagery. If there are enough 
thoughts like this, and if thoughts are determinate due to their linguistic contents, we once 
again forgo our rationale for supposing that conscious thoughts are more determinate than 
unconscious beliefs. Of course, some thoughts would still be determinate on such an 
account. But this would be a far cry from the sort of widespread asymmetry assumed in 
Crane’s picture. 
And what if we adopt a more restricted notion? If paradigm examples of thought 
instead are things like judgements, opinions, inner speech — all things which tend to  have 
linguistic content— then Crane’s picture, that (conscious) thoughts are more determinate 
than our (unconscious) beliefs, becomes more plausible. But one major difficulty with 
adopting a more restricted notion is how to rule out things like daydreams, arithmetic 
calculations and worries from counting as species of thought. This is not a trivial task for 
to claim that they aren’t thoughts because they aren’t linguistic, in this context, would be 
to beg the question. What’s more, there is a whole range of thinking which doesn’t seem to 
require any words. For example, Harman asks us to consider 'a chess-player trying to 
frame a strategy, a mechanic trying to decide what is wrong with the motor of a car, or an 
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an artist thinking whether to apply a dab of paint at a particular spot on canvas' (1973, p. 
84). According to Harman, these are all instances of thinking which don’t involve words. I 
think that's right. The diversity of the sorts of occurrences we typically count as thinking 
dampens the hope for a restrictive notion which would deliver the verdict that most 
thoughts have words as their contents. Consequently, for the time being, we can note that 
this way of supporting Crane’s view remains at best speculative. The take-home message, 
then, remains the same: within the context of what Crane claims about the indeterminate 
nature of our unconscious beliefs, a problem-free account of what makes most of our 
thoughts determinate is lacking on his picture.
5. Conclusion
There is much to like about Crane’s paper. In particular, I think he is right to point out that 
the widespread practice of ascribing propositional contents to unconscious beliefs is 
plausibly understood as a form of modelling, one which might mask an underlying 
indeterminate nature. But I think a similar point can also be made with regards to how we 
understand conscious thought. To talk of thoughts as linguistic entities is also plausibly 
understood as a form of modelling which may conceal an indeterminate nature. 
Crane, however, claims that there is an asymmetry between conscious and 
unconscious intentionality. I have argued that this asymmetry rests on two assumptions: 
interpretationism about belief and sententialism about thought. The first assumption helps 
explain why Crane thinks beliefs are indeterminate, and in a way which still allows for 
thoughts to be determinate. Furthermore, the second clarifies why he must think most 
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thoughts are, as a matter of fact, determinate. In short, thinking in words always yields 
thoughts with determinate contents. 
In this paper, we have found the second of these assumptions to be insufficiently 
motivated. One lesson form this is that Crane simply doesn’t go far enough. That is, if he is 
right about unconscious intentional states being (relatively) indeterminate, this suggests 
that conscious intentional states are indeterminate in a similar manner as well. This, in 
effect, is to side with one aspect of the contemporary view, the part which assumes that 
conscious and unconscious intentionality is isomorphic. But crucially, this isomorphism is 
preserved not for the reasons we originally thought. The structure of psychological reality, 
both conscious and unconscious, it would appear, is far less determinate than we ever 
imagined.
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